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THE MAKING AVAILABLE ARGUMENT: 
IS ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED TO FIND 
INFRINGEMENT UPON THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER’S 
DISTRIBUTION RIGHT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The advancement of technology has prompted a revolution that alters 
the amount of freely and easily accessible information.1  The widespread 
use of computers, electronic networks, and the Internet have added to the 
wealth of readily accessible information.2  The amount of information 
available is constantly increasing and expanding across a vast array of cate-
gories.3  Government documents, newspaper articles, college campus tours, 
and airplane tickets are all available with the click of a mouse.4  This new 
inventory of information is recorded on a digital medium, which allows the 
creation, publication, distribution, use, and reuse of information to occur 
faster and easier than ever before.5 
The benefit of these technologies is the colossal growth in information 
available to society.6  Conversely, the same technologies raise difficult and 
controversial issues concerning intellectual property.7  Copyright infringe-
ment is one such issue, because the technologies that make access easy also 
make illegal copying and illegal distributing easy.8  The Internet is an infor-
mation resource of extraordinary size and depth, making it one of the 
world’s largest libraries.9  The Internet is also the world’s largest copy ma-
chine and distributer.10  As a result, many of the copyright rules and prac-
 
1. COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, 
COMPUTER SCI. AND TELLCOMM. BD., THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 23 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA]. 
2. Id. 
3. See BRUCE J. MCLAREN, UNDERSTANDING AND USING THE INTERNET 8 (1997 ed.) (stat-
ing that the amount of information available on the internet is unlimited). 
4. Id. 
5. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 23. 
6. Id. 
7. See GRETCHEN MCCORD HOFFMAN, COPYRIGHT IN CYBERSPACE 2, 101 (2005) (noting 
technology used to make unauthorized copies of digital files).  Intellectual property is a category 
of intangible rights, consisting primarily of trade secrets, trademarks, copyrights, and patent 
rights, which protect commercially valuable products of the human intellect. See MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 24-30 (4th ed. 2007). 
8. See HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 101 (explaining the ease of file-sharing). 
9. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 23. 
10. Id. 
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tices that evolved in the world of physical artifacts are easily violated in a 
digital environment.11 
All media industries are affected by the outdated copyright laws of to-
day’s digital world, but the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) arguably has been impacted the most.12  Alvin Toffler might de-
scribe the RIAA as residing in a state of “future shock.”13  Future shock, as 
described by Toffler, is a psychological state that results when individuals 
and societies undergo technological change too quickly.14  Future shock is 
present in our society’s nexus of music, digital technology, and copyright 
law, where our laws have failed to adequately address the legal issues that 
arise from their combination.15  Peer-to-peer networks, filesharing, MP3s, 
and Internet Protocols are terms that cannot be found in the 1976 Copyright 
Act; they did not even exist at the time of the Act’s creation.16  The RIAA 
responded to its future shock by choosing to pursue litigation.17 
This article examines the RIAA’s claim that making a copyrighted 
work available for distribution over a peer-to-peer computer network—the 
making available argument—is a violation of the copyright holder’s exclu-
sive distribution right.18  Part II of this article focuses on the RIAA’s law-
suits against users of peer-to-peer networks and the framework of the 
RIAA’s making available theory.  Part III discusses landmark decisions that 
 
11. Id. at 25. 
12. See HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 102 (explaining that RIAA has used a lot of resources 
against those using file-sharing). 
13. See ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 13 (1970) [hereinafter FUTURE SHOCK] (defining 
future shock as “the dizzying disorientation brought on by the premature arrival of the future.  
Future shock is. . .  a product of the greatly accelerated rate of change in society.”).  Toffler, noted 
futurist and author of four books about the digital, corporate, and communications revolutions, 
served as Visiting Professor at Cornell University and the Russell Sage Foundation. ALVIN 
TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 544 (1980). 
14. FUTURE SHOCK, supra note 13, at 13. 
15. DRAEKE WESEMAN, FUTURE SHOCK AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976:  IS MERELY 
MAKING A COPYRIGHTED WORK AVAILABLE FOR DIGITAL TRANSMISSION A VIOLATION OF 
§ 106(3) 1 (2008), available at http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/future_shock_making_ 
available.pdf. 
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing the definitions within the Copyright Act); WESEMAN, 
supra note 15, at 1.  A peer-to-peer network is a computer communication model in which com-
puters collaboratively perform a task, such as a file transfer. DAVID BARKAI, PEER-TO-PEER 
COMPUTING: TECHNOLOGIES FOR SHARING AND COLLABORATING ON THE NET 305 (2001).  Two 
identifying characteristics of peer-to-peer networks include the lack of a central control server, 
which allows direct communications between two users, and efficient use of the network’s capac-
ity. Id.  An MP3, the common name of an MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 file, is the most popular digital 
audio compression algorithm in use on the Internet. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond 
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999).  The compression algorithm makes 
the audio file “smaller” by limiting the audio bandwidth without significantly reducing sound 
quality. Id. 
17. See WESEMAN, supra note 15, at 2. 
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006) (listing the exclusive rights of copyright holders). 
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provide analyses of a copyright holder’s exclusive right of distribution.  
Two decisions, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas19 and Atlantic Recording 
Corp. v. Howell,20 provide foundational principles for discussion and analy-
sis of the arguments offered by both proponents and opponents of the mak-
ing available argument.21  Finally, this article proposes that Congress 
amend the outdated Copyright Act. 
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF MAKING AVAILABLE LITIGATION 
In lawsuits filed against individual consumers, the RIAA contends, as 
its foundational legal theory, that making a file available for distribution 
constitutes copyright infringement.22  The following analysis of the making 
available argument will begin with an explanation of the argument’s un-
derlying law—the Copyright Act.  Part C will describe a peer-to-peer net-
work’s architecture, operations, and facilitation of digital file distribution, 
which will serve as an introduction to the evidence the RIAA uses to sup-
port its claims. 
A. THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
The framers of the Constitution granted Congress the power to regulate 
copyright laws.23  The constitutional provision promoting “the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” 
bestowed that power upon Congress.24  Acting on that power, Congress 
provided several revisions to the original Copyright Act of 1790.25  The 
first major change occurred in the early twentieth century.26  The Copyright 
Act of 1909 provided for several substantial changes, one of which ex-
panded the scope of the copyright law to cover “all writings of an author.”27  
Additionally, the 1909 Act doubled the term of copyright protection from 
two fourteen-year terms to two twenty-eight year terms and protected work 
 
19. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
20. 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
21. See discussion infra Part III.C-D. 
22. See Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defen-
dant at 1-2, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497) 
[hereinafter EFF Thomas Brief] (providing part of the jury instructions from the RIAA’s first jury 
trial using the making available argument). 
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
24. Id. 
25. HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 7. 
26. Id. 
27. Id.; Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
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with notice of copyright immediately upon publication.28  Congress 
amended the 1909 Act several times to keep the act current in an 
increasingly technological world.29  The Sound Recording Act of 1971 was 
one such amendment.30  This amendment accorded federal statutory 
protection to sound recordings for the first time.31  In 1955, Congress 
authorized a revision of the Copyright Act, and after twenty years, that 
authorization resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976.32 
The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act provided for two vital develop-
ments.33  First, digital advancements required that the law take a new look 
at the scope of copyrights to determine what other types of works should be 
afforded copyright protections and if certain conduct should constitute 
infringement.34  Additionally, a need existed for a new statute that would 
bring the United States into alignment with international copyright laws and 
policies.35 
The 1976 Copyright Act provided a copyright owner with five exclu-
sive rights to ensure the opportunity to use the product for profit.36  The five 
exclusive rights are: “(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . ; (2) to pre-
pare derivative works . . . ; (3) to distribute copies [of the work] . . . ; (4) . . . 
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; [and] (5) . . . to display the copy-
righted work publicly. . . .”37  The United States Copyright Act of 1976 
gave copyright owners the exclusive right to distribute copies of the copy-
righted work by sale, lease, or other transfer to the public.38  While the lan-
guage seems straightforward, it is very broad.39  As a result, the statutory 
 
28. HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 7.  Under the original Act, the first term renewed after expira-
tion only if the author survived. Id.  The original Act also required works to be registered to gain 
copyright protections. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
31. See id. 
32. HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 7; see David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) (providing an evaluation of every provision of the 1976 Act 
and every adopted amendment through 2003). 
33. LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE 1990S 17 (Special Libraries Association) (1994). 
34. Id. 
35. Id.; see discussion infra Part III.D.2 (noting the implications of international treaties on 
the interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)). 
36. GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 33, at 19. 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
38. Id. § 106(3). 
39. John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of American:  Review 
and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1989). 
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language has been the focus of many copyright infringement lawsuits filed 
by the RIAA against individual consumers.40 
B. LAWSUITS FILED BY THE RIAA AGAINST CONSUMERS 
In 2003, the RIAA, a large, wealthy, corporate entity, began a massive 
litigation campaign on behalf of the four largest recording companies in the 
world:  Vivendi/Universal, Warner Brothers Records, SONY BMG, and 
EMI.41  The RIAA filed two hundred sixty-one lawsuits against individuals 
using peer-to-peer networks.42  Each lawsuit alleged that users infringed on 
sound recording copyrights owned by the RIAA.43  Each suit filed by the 
RIAA contained a variation of the following complaint:  “Plaintiffs are in-
formed and believe that each Defendant, without the permission or consent 
of Plaintiffs, has used, and continues to use, an online media distribution 
system to download, distribute to the public, and/or make available for dis-
tribution to others, certain of the Copyrighted Recordings.”44 
After the initial 261 lawsuits were filed, the RIAA sued an estimated 
30,000 people in district court for copyright infringement.45  The targets of 
these lawsuits included children, grandparents, unemployed single mothers, 
and college professors—a random sample of the millions who use peer-to-
peer networks.46  The RIAA brought at least one lawsuit against a deceased 
individual, who the RIAA claimed made more than 700 songs available for 
distribution.47  The RIAA filed another lawsuit against a family who neither 
owned a computer nor had Internet access.48  A majority of defendants in 
the RIAA’s lawsuits defaulted.49  This resulted in the RIAA receiving 
 
40. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
41. See Ray Beckerman, Large Recording Companies v. The Defenseless:  Some Common 
Sense Solutions to the Challenges of the RIAA Litigations, 47 JUDGES J. Summer 2008, at 20 
(stating that the four largest record companies have started litigation and are represented by the 
RIAA). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. E.g., Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 1, London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 
542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 04cv12434-NG) (emphasis added) (indicating the 
RIAA argues that making a file available constitutes copyright infringement). 
45. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA V. THE PEOPLE:  FIVE YEARS LATER 1 
(2008), available at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter FIVE YEARS]. 
46. Id. 
47. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead 83 Year Old Deceased Woman in Copyright 
Violation, THE REGISTER, Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_ 
dead/. 
48. Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Computer-less Family, 234 Others, for File Sharing, ARS 
TECHNICA, Apr. 24, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060424-6662 html/. 
49. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 20. 
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default judgments in amounts greater than 2,000 times the actual damages 
sustained by the plaintiffs.50 
Analysts have determined that the wholesale price of each song file is 
approximately seventy cents.51  The RIAA’s actual realized damages result-
ing from each illegal download are estimated at thirty-five cents.52  Copy-
right owners have the option of electing to pursue actual damages or statu-
tory damages against an infringer of their copyrights.53  In lieu of proving 
thirty-five cents per song file in actual damages, the RIAA chooses to pur-
sue statutory damages.54  By statute, for each illegally downloaded song, a 
copyright owner is allowed to collect a sum of not less than $750 or more 
than $150,000.55  In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas,56 the only case 
known to have gone to trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff damages that 
amounted to $9,250 per song.57  This amount represents nearly 23,000 
times the actual damages.58 
Of the defendants who do not default, most agree to pay a settlement of 
$3,000 to $11,000 to avoid paying a potential $100,000 judgment.59  The 
average settlement amount is in excess of 1,000 times the plaintiff’s actual 
damages.60  A great number of the defendants who chose to settle likely 
never engaged in any form of illegal file sharing.61  Also, it has not been 
generally established whether the act of file sharing constitutes copyright 
infringement.62 
The reasons defendants agree to settlements with the RIAA need to be 
considered.63  The defendants settle because the alternative is going to trial, 
which when drawn out, is not practical.64  The risk of an adverse verdict re-
sults in such a large financial penalty, that even with the best defense, 
defendants are too fearful to fight the allegations of copyright 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 29 n.3. 
52. Id. 
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (listing the possible remedies for copyright 
infringement). 
54. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 29 n.3. 
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006) (describing the statutory damages available for copy-
right infringement). 
56. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
57. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.  Accord Beckerman, supra note 41, at 29 n.3 (discuss-
ing the reasons defendants choose to settle their lawsuits against the RIAA). 
58. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 29 n.3. 
59. FIVE YEARS, supra note 45, at 5. 
60. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 20. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. 
64. Id. 
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infringement.65  A Chicago court awarded a $22,500 judgment against a 
woman who fought and lost a lawsuit the RIAA brought against her.66  
Similarly, an Arizona court entered a $40,850 judgment against a man who 
defended himself pro se.67  Furthermore, the only file-sharing case to be 
tried by a jury found the defendant liable for $220,000 in statutory damages 
for making twenty-four songs available for others to download over the 
Internet.68 
Of the defendants who have neither defaulted nor settled, but have cho-
sen to defend their claims, very few have had any form of legal representa-
tion.69  These defendants represent themselves to avoid attorneys’ fees from 
extensive litigation.70  The actions taken by the defendants in the RIAA’s 
lawsuits raise concerns.71  The RIAA is waging a litigious war against indi-
viduals who can ill-afford the costs of litigation.72  Compounding the di-
lemma, the claims brought by the RIAA are based on interpretations of law 
that are in need of clarification.73  In Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. 
O’Brien,74 the Central District of California stated, “[t]he concern of this 
Court is that in these lawsuits, potentially meritorious legal and factual de-
fenses are not being litigated, and instead, the federal judiciary is being 
used as a hammer by a small group of plaintiffs to pound settlements out of 
unrepresented defendants.”75  To understand how the RIAA supported these 
allegations of copyright infringement, the next section discusses the basic 
framework of a peer-to-peer network. 
 
65. See id. 
66. FIVE YEARS, supra note 45, at 5. 
67. Id. 
68. Id.; see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (D. Minn. 
2008) (providing background and history of the case). 
69. Beckerman, supra note 41, at 20. 
70. Id. 
71. See id. 
72. David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual 
Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1689 
(2005). 
73. See id. 
74. No. CV 06-5289 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007), available at 
www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDFfull.asp?filename=elektra_obrien_070302Decision. 
75. O’Brien, 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1555 at *2.  O’Brien was accused of sharing copyrighted 
works over a peer-to-peer network. Id.  The RIAA filed an amended complaint adding a second 
defendant without providing any factual support that the defendants were in any way related to 
each other, acted together, or acted as a group in the infringement action. Id.  The RIAA was or-
dered to show cause why the case against the defendants should not be dismissed. Id. 
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C. THE NATURE OF PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS 
Today’s digital technology allows novice computer users to record au-
dio in the form of compact discs.76  The users may then compress the com-
pact discs into digital files that require little storage space.77  Consequently, 
these compressed sound recordings, which exhibit little to unnoticeable de-
gradation in sound quality, are easily downloaded or uploaded via the Inter-
net.78  One popular way computer users transfer these sound recordings is 
through peer-to-peer networks.79 
There are several different forms of peer-to-peer networks, each with 
distinct advantages and disadvantages.80  However, this article focuses on 
the “pure” peer-to-peer architecture.81  The pure, or decentralized, peer-to-
peer network software allows users to communicate directly, without the 
need to route transmissions through a central server—thus the term “peer-
to-peer” as opposed to “client-server.”82  A user of a peer-to-peer network 
requires only a single connection to a current peer-to-peer user to be vir-
tually connected to everyone with whom the current user is connected.83  
Once a user downloads the peer-to-peer software, the role of the software 
provider is terminated.84  Due to the lack of a central server, peer-to-peer 
networks self-operate and continue to run even if the software provider’s 
computer network is inaccessible.85  As a result of the elimination of a cen-
tral server, users on a peer-to-peer network may “remain relatively ano-
nymous or pseudonymous.”86  Any file transactions occurring through peer-
to-peer networks “are not easily observable by a third party.”87  When two 
computers interact through a peer-to-peer network, the only user-
 
76. Michael Suppappola, The End of the World As We Know It? The State of Decentralized 
Peer-to-Peer Technologies in the Wake of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 4 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 122, 126 (2004). 
77. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
the process of “ripping” a compact disc).  Ripping software allows an individual to store the audio 
recordings on the disc directly on the computer’s hard drive. Id.  The ripping process converts the 
data on the compact disc to a compressed file format called MP3. Id.  The compressed format of 
MP3s allows for accelerated transfers from one computer to another via peer-to-peer networks.  
Id. 
78. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 124. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 125. 
81. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D. Mass. 2008). 
82. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 126. 
83. David J. Colletti, Jr., Technology Under Siege:  Peer-to-Peer Technology Is the Victim of 
the Entertainment Industry’s Misguided Attack, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 265 (2003). 
84. Id. 
85. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 126. 
86. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159. 
87. See id. at 159-60 (noting that users can be easily identified by a user name). 
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identifying information exchanged consists of the user’s Internet Protocol 
(IP) address and the user-name pseudonym under which each user 
operates.88  The very nature of a peer-to-peer network and its corresponding 
software is to easily allow peer-to-peer users to control the information 
displayed to the world.89  The software’s simplicity and user-friendly 
interface allows anyone with the software and an Internet connection to 
participate in open peer-to-peer networks and transfers.90 
Although peer-to-peer networks are routinely used for transferring 
copyrighted sound recordings to other users, the networks serve many other 
non-illegal purposes as well.91  Many of the files transferred over peer-to-
peer networks are lawful.92  The elimination of a central server to mediate 
the exchange of files allows peer-to-peer network users to complete file 
transfers using less bandwidth and time.93  Peer-to-peer users also do not 
have to consider the possibility of server failure when transferring files.94 
A large quantity of copyrighted files are transferred via peer-to-peer 
networks as well.95  The very nature of the peer-to-peer network has made 
it a viable, attractive, and practical option for individuals to share and 
expand their digital libraries.96  Peer-to-peer networks create significant 
problems for copyright owners who have tried to enforce copyright pro-
tections.97  Peer-to-peer networks also pose an incredible challenge for the 
RIAA.98  The RIAA responded to the challenge with litigation premised on 
the argument that making a protected work available for distribution is an 
infringement of the owner’s copyright.99 
 
88. See id. (summarizing the basic operation of peer-to-peer networks). 
89. Id. at 159. 
90. Id. 
91. See HOFFMAN, supra note 7, at 101 (“[n]othing is inherently wrong with file-sharing”). 
92. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159. 
93. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 (2005). 
94. Id. 
95. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 67 (2004). 
96. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (noting the anonymity of its users, the inability 
of third-parties to observe transactions, and the limited bandwidth required for speedy transfers 
and its ease of use).  Bandwidth is “[t]he transmission capacity of an electronic pathway such as a 
communications line,” and is typically used to describe how much information can be transferred 
over a connection. PCMAG.com, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=bandwidth 
&i=38401,00.asp (last visited Aug. 11, 2009). 
97. Suppappola, supra note 76, at 127. 
98. See id. at 123 (noting that the RIAA’s strategy of directly suing users of file sharing pro-
grams often results in suing their own customers). 
99. WESEMAN, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
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D. THE MAKING AVAILABLE ARGUMENT 
To combat copyright infringement over peer-to-peer networks, the 
RIAA relies on the theory that making copyrighted works available for dis-
tribution to others is a violation of a copyright owner’s exclusive distribu-
tion right under section 106(3) of the Copyright Act.100  This theory is la-
beled the “making available” claim.101  According to section 106(3):  “The 
owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any 
of the following: . . . (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by ren-
tal, lease, or lending. . . .”102  The language the RIAA uses in its complaint 
of copyright infringement is mostly boilerplate and contains no facts per-
taining specifically to each individual defendant.103  The complaint alleges 
that a defendant infringed the sound recording copyrights owned by the 
RIAA by using a peer-to-peer network to download, publicly distribute, or 
make available for distribution a copyrighted work without the RIAA’s 
permission or consent.104  The allegation appears to be direct and clear, but 
defendants argue, and judges have ruled, that the allegation fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.105 
E. THE EVIDENCE 
The evidence that the RIAA uses to support its claims against file 
sharers operating on peer-to-peer systems is gathered by a third-party in-
vestigator named MediaSentry, Inc.106  MediaSentry has been hired by the 
RIAA to search peer-to-peer networks for other computer users who make 
copyrighted sound recordings available for additional peer-to-peer users to 
download.107  When MediaSentry finds copyrighted files, it downloads the 
files from the computer user that made them available.108  During the 
 
100. Id. at 2. 
101. See Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *4 
(W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006) (stating that the court was not prepared to rule out the RIAA’s making 
available theory). 
102. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2007). 
103. Interscope Records v. Rodriguez, No. 06cv2485-B (NLS), 2007 WL 2408484, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007). 
104. E.g., Complaint for Copyright Infringement, supra note 44, at 159. 
105. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(admitting that the court created a manifest error of law by allowing the making available argu-
ment in his jury instructions); Rodriguez, 2007 WL 2408484, at *1 (denying the RIAA’s motion 
for entry of default judgement and vacating the Court Clerk’s entry of default). 
106. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159-60 (D. Mass. 2008). 
107. Id. at 160. 
108. Id. 
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process, MediaSentry obtains information about the computer user.109  The 
information typically includes a user-name, a list of downloaded songs, and 
several screen captures indicating the date and time at which the files were 
made available and downloaded by MediaSentry.110  MediaSentry also ac-
quires the peer-to-peer user’s IP number.111 
After MediaSentry downloads the files from the peer-to-peer user, it 
reviews a listing of the music files to determine whether they are copy-
righted sound recordings.112  The music files are then played to confirm that 
the files are indeed sound recordings whose copyrights are owned by the 
RIAA.113  Upon confirmation that the music files are copyrighted works 
owned by the RIAA, the RIAA concludes that it has enough evidence and 
subsequently files a lawsuit.114 
However, several problems arise with the evidence obtained by 
MediaSentry.115  These problems limit the RIAA’s allegations.116  One 
problem is that MediaSentry acts on behalf of the RIAA.117  Therefore, 
MediaSentry’s downloads may be authorized and not considered copyright 
infringement.118  Additionally, the RIAA is unable to prove that the peer-to-
peer user actually transferred files to another computer other than the 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id.  An IP number is also known as an Internet Protocol (IP) address. Id.  Every com-
puter on the Internet has an IP address, which uniquely defines that computer and enables com-
puters to find each other on the Internet.  See, e.g., America Online v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 
848, 851 (E.D. Va. 2000) (discussing the basic communication between computers on the Inter-
net).  Each IP address is represented by a series of four numbers between 0 and 255. Id.  However, 
most computer users do not have a constant IP address or “static” address.  London-Sire, 542 F. 
Supp. 2d at 160.  Instead, many computer users connect to a network that is provided by their 
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Id.  The ISP has a certain range of IP addresses that it can assign 
to its users, and it makes these assignments on an as-needed basis. Id.  This process is known as 
“dynamic” addressing and makes the RIAA’s task of discovering the identity of a particular in-
fringer very difficult. Id.  Difficulty arises because one IP address that records show belongs to 
one particular user’s computer may be assigned to another user’s computer. See H. Brian Holland, 
Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting Rights & Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. 
L. & POL’Y 301, 305 nn.13-18 (2005).  IP addresses lead the RIAA to the user’s ISP, and the ISP 
typically records a log of the IP address assigned to each user at a particular time. London-Sire, 
542 F. Supp. 2d at 160.  However, those logs are typically purged after a short period of time. Id. 
112. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (D. Mass. 2008). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 166. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. (“Arguably . . . MediaSentry’s own downloads are not themselves copyright 
infringements because it is acting as an agent of the copyright holder, and copyright holders can-
not infringe their own rights.”).  The court did not reach the issue in London-Sire.  But see Atlan-
tic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding that downloads 
performed by MediaSentry were unauthorized). 
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computer used by MediaSentry during its investigations.119  Finally, the 
evidence gathered by MediaSentry cannot ascertain that the files on the 
peer-to-peer user’s computer are illegitimate copies of music “space-
shifted” from the peer-to-peer user’s own CD collection to the user’s 
computer hard drive.120  Therefore, the only claim generally supported by 
the direct evidence obtained by MediaSentry is the RIAA’s making avail-
able claim.121  Due to the fact that the RIAA is unable to establish actual 
distribution between two individual peer-to-peer users, the RIAA is forced 
to pursue their claims using the making available theory.122  The adoption 
of this interpretation of the Copyright Act without an unequivocal ex-
pression of congressional intent will have many disruptive consequences.123 
F. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER INTERPRETATION: 
WHAT IS AT STAKE 
Several reasons exist to interpret and understand the Copyright Act in 
the way Congress intended.124  One such reason derives from the immense 
penalties provided by law to an individual who is guilty of copyright in-
fringement.125  Claims of copyright infringement are broadly construed to 
contain two elements:  (1) proof of ownership, and (2) proof of a use in 
violation of one or more exclusive statutory rights, provided to the 
owner.126  Since copyright cases do not require proof of actual damage, 
satisfying the two required elements leads to statutory damages that are 
 
119. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 175-76 (holding a file that was downloaded at least 
once sufficient to make out a prima facie case). 
120. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 
(9th Cir. 1999).  “Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent 
with the purposes of the [Audio Home Recording Act of 1992].” Id.  Congress created the Audio 
Home Recording Act of 1992 “to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or digital audio 
recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.”  S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 
86 (1992).  The Diamond court used the term “space-shifting” in reference to a copyright law 
concept that would allow owners of a copyrighted work to convert the work from one format to 
another, such as converting an audio compact disc to MP3 files. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1079.  The 
court analogized space-shifting to the term “time-shifting” used in Sony Corp. of America v. Uni-
versal City Studio. Id.; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studio, 464 U.S. 417, 455 
(1984).  In Sony Corp., the United States Supreme Court held that the time-shifting of copyrighted 
television shows with VCRs constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act and thus is not an in-
fringement. Sony Corp., 464 U.S at 455. 
121. See EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 2 (stating that the RIAA is unable to properly 
prove that copies of protected works have been distributed and that harm was inflicted on the cop-
yright owner). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 13. 
124. Id. at 2. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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exceedingly out of proportion to any actual harm the copyright holder 
realizes.127  Considering the serious consequences that arise from copyright 
infringement’s strict liability damages system, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation urges courts to be cautious not to expand copyright protections 
beyond the scope of Congress’ intent.128 
There are two types of copyright infringement: direct copyright in-
fringement and secondary copyright infringement.129  Under direct infringe-
ment, the plaintiff must show proof of ownership of a valid copyright and 
proof that the defendant created a copy.130  The copying requirement can be 
satisfied by either of two ways.131  It can be satisfied by submitting direct 
evidence of copying or by presenting evidence establishing the defendant 
was able to access the copyrighted work and that the copy is substantially 
similar to the original work.132  After meeting the initial requirements, the 
plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated one of the copyright 
holder’s exclusive protections.133  Knowledge or intent to infringe is not 
required to find direct copyright infringement.134 
Secondary copyright infringement applies when defendants do not per-
sonally engage in the violating activity but still take a share of responsibil-
ity for the infringement.135  Secondary copyright infringement falls into two 
categories:  contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.136  Contri-
butory copyright infringement requires that a defendant “has knowledge of 
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another.”137  Vicarious copyright infringement re-
 
127. See id. (stating that in Thomas, the defendant was found statutorily liable by the jury for 
more than $222,000 for allowing the public to download various copyrighted songs from her 
shared folder); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(C)(1) (2004) (describing the statutory damages available 
for copyright infringement). 
128. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 16.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation is donor-
funded nonprofit organization based in California that works to protect the public interest in issues 
related to technology that affect an individual’s fundamental and digital rights. About EFF:  
Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/about (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). 
129. Mark E. Harrington, On-line Copyright Infringement Liability for Internet Service 
Providers:  Context, Cases & Recently Enacted Legislation, 1999 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 
60499, ¶ 13 (1999). 
130. Harrington, supra note 129, ¶ 14. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. ¶ 15. 
136. Id. 
137. Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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quires the defendant to have the right and ability to control the infringer’s 
acts and to receive a direct financial benefit from the infringement.138 
By accepting the making available theory, courts could make the copy-
right laws so complex they jeopardize the legitimate interests of consumers 
and technology innovators alike.139  Broadcasters rely on compulsory and 
negotiated licenses that entitle them to publicly broadcast copyrighted 
works over the air.140  If courts find the distribution right to support the 
RIAA’s making available argument, questions would be raised whether 
broadcasters are required to obtain additional distribution licenses.141  For 
example, in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio,142 the RIAA 
used the making available argument against XM Satellite Radio.143  The 
RIAA alleged that the radio service infringed upon its copyrights by distri-
buting copyrighted sound recordings to the public through satellite radio 
transmission, even though XM had a license to do so.144  The idea that 
distribution occurs when a copyrighted work is made available puts the dis-
tinction between public performance and distribution in peril.145  Therefore, 
webcasters and broadcasters are potentially exposed to massive infringe-
ment liability.146 
Other attempts to use expansive interpretations of distribution focus on 
transferring secondary liability claims to direct infringement claims.147  In 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,148 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
heard the argument of Perfect 10 that the Internet search engine Google in-
fringed on Perfect 10’s distribution right.149  Perfect 10 accused Google of 
making Perfect 10’s copyrighted photographs available to the public on 
 
138. Id. at 1162. 
139. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 13. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. No. 1:06-cv-03733-DAB, 2007 WL 136186 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2007). 
143. See XM Satellite Radio, 2007 WL 136186, at *1-2 (alleging XM’s portable “Inno” de-
vice, which was marketed highlighting the device’s recording and library capabilities, induced 
contributory infringement).  Atlantic and XM reached an undisclosed settlement in December 
2007, but other RIAA companies continued to pursue litigation.  JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET 
LAW:  A FIELD GUIDE 274 (6th ed. 2008); EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 14. 
144. XM Satellite Radio, 2007 WL 136186, at *1-2. 
145. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 14. 
146. Id. (citing Agee v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 325 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is 
clear that merely transmitting a sound recording to the public on the airwaves does not constitute a 
distribution.”)). 
147. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007) (alleging 
Google’s internet search engine was violating Perfect 10’s distribution right by making links to 
files of Perfect 10’s copyrighted work, which were uploaded to the internet by third-parties, avail-
able to the public). 
148. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
149. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162. 
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Google’s search engine.150  Perfect 10 sought a direct infringement claim 
against Google even though the photographs were uploaded to the Internet 
by third parties without any evidence that users actually copied the photo-
graphs.151  Similar direct infringement claims could be made against other 
businesses that have created systems to aid individuals in finding copy-
righted works via the Internet.152 
If the meaning of distribution should be expanded to include the 
RIAA’s making available argument, that expansion should derive from 
Congress, not the courts.153  It is sound policy, and supported by history, for 
courts to yield judgment and defer to Congress when significant advances 
in technology raise questions concerning copyright law.154  Numerous cases 
before the United States Supreme Court emphasized the need for congres-
sional guidance before courts rule and expand the statutory rights under the 
Copyright Act.155 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.156 is an 
example of such a case.157  In Teleprompter, producers of a copyrighted 
television show alleged the owners and operators of a community antenna 
television (CATV) system infringed on the producer’s copyrights by inter-
cepting the television show’s broadcast and rechanneling it through their 
CATV system to paying subscribers.158  In making its ruling, the Supreme 
Court noted that the growth of the communications industry can not be 
controlled through litigation based on the 1909 Copyright Act where neither 
broadcast television nor cable television had yet been conceived.159  The 
court further noted that an ultimate resolution to the sensitive and important 
problems found in the explosive development of cable television must be 
left for Congress to decide.160 
Another example is Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.161  
In Bonito, the Supreme Court declined to allow a state statute to provide for 
 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001). 
153. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
157. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414 (“Detailed regulation of these relationships, and any 
ultimate resolution of the many sensitive and important problems in this field, must be left to 
Congress.”). 
158. Id. at 396-97. 
159. Id. at 414. 
160. Id. at 414, 422. 
161. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
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greater industrial design protections.162  In reaching its decision, the Court 
noted Congress’ explicit refusal to alter copyright law, despite the fact that 
Congress has been subject to years of criticism regarding its refusal to ex-
pand copyright protections.163 
Additionally, The Electronic Frontier Foundation suggests that the 
making available argument acts to undermine civil procedure and labels the 
argument as a “thinly veiled attempt to avoid the burden of proving their 
case.”164  Thousands of cases in all areas of law are annually dismissed be-
cause plaintiffs are unable to present the necessary evidence required to es-
tablish what would otherwise be a meritorious case.165  Although it may be 
difficult for the RIAA to obtain the proper and necessary evidence required 
to prove actual distribution, alleviating the RIAA’s difficulties is not a rea-
son to expand the law’s plain statutory language.166 
III. ANALYSIS THROUGH LANDMARK DECISIONS 
The cases discussed in this part of the article provide important 
analyses on how to interpret section 106(3).  National Car Rental Systems, 
Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.167 is notable because it pro-
vided an interpretation of section 106(3) and provided a framework for 
subsequent cases.168  Next, Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints169 issued a ruling that broadened copyright protections and pro-
vided a foundation for the RIAA’s making available theory.170  Atlantic Re-
cording Corporation v. Howell addressed the definition of distribution, 
whether distribution is synonymous with publication, the admissibility of 
evidence obtained by MediaSentry, and if digital transfers meet the defini-
tion of exchanges found within the Copyright Act.171  Finally, Capitol 
 
162. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 168 (holding a Florida statute that provided a patent-like protection 
of ideas pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause). 
163. Id. at 167-68. 
164. EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 14. 
165. Expert praises, criticizes, Atlantic v. Howell decision, http://government.zdnet.com/ 
?p=3783 (Apr. 30, 2008, 22:17 EST) (citing posting of William Patry to The Patry Copyright 
Blog).  William Patry, author of the blog, is regarded as one of the leading copyright commenta-
tors and has published a seven volume treatise on copyright law. Id.; William F. Patry—Biogra-
phy, http://west.thomson.com/about/keyauthor/patry.aspx. 
166. See EFF Thomas Brief, supra note 22, at 13-14 (expressing the opinion that the law 
should not be interpreted to further aid the RIAA in filing lawsuits against consumers engaging in 
noncommercial activity within their own homes). 
167. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993). 
168. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
169. 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997). 
170. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
171. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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Records, Inc. v. Thomas addressed how an expanded definition of distribu-
tion, the impact of international treaty agreements, and large statutory dam-
age awards affect the Copyright Act.172 
A. NATIONAL CAR RENTAL SYSTEM, INC. V. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES 
INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
In National Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. Computer Associates Interna-
tional, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of 
whether National Car Rental Systems, Inc. (National), violated the Copy-
right Act and its license agreement with Computer Associates International, 
Inc. (Computer Associates), when National used a computer program li-
censed by Computer Associates to process data for other companies.173  
Computer Associates created software and licensed its software for other 
businesses to use.174  National used licensed software from Computer Asso-
ciates.175  By the terms of the licenses, National could use the software for 
its own internal operations only, and in no event could National use the 
software to process the data of a third party.176 
Computer Associates filed suit against National, alleging that National 
used the program to the benefit of a third party.177  Computer Associates 
further alleged that National’s breach of contract constituted an infringe-
ment of Computer Associates’ copyright because it created an unauthorized 
copy of the software.178  In order to address the complaint, the court was re-
quired to determine whether National’s improper usage of Computer Asso-
ciates’ program violated a right equivalent to one of the exclusive rights 
under the Copyright Act.179  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that contractual restrictions regulating the use of programs was a 
supplemental requirement and withdrew the cause of action for copyright 
protection.180  Therefore, the court held that making programs available for 
use by third parties did not constitute distribution.181  The court stated, 
“even with respect to computer software, the distribution right is only the 
right to distribute copies of the work.  As Professor Nimmer has stated, 
 
172. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
173. National Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 427-28 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
174. Id. at 427. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 428. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 430-31. 
180. Id. at 432. 
181. Id. at 432-33. 
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‘[i]nfringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination 
of either copies or phonorecords.’”182 
National Car Rental System, although not directly related to the copy-
right infringement of peer-to-peer networks, established precedent in the 
Eight Circuit on how section 106(3) should be interpreted.183  Several 
courts have relied on National Car Rental System in making their determi-
nations on how to interpret section 106(3) in the context of peer-to-peer 
network downloading.184  In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited to the National Car 
Rental System court’s determination of how to establish “distribution.”185 
B. HOTALING V. CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 
In Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a library 
owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Church) made 
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted microfiche file authored and copy-
righted by the Hotalings.186  Several of the Church’s branch libraries, lo-
cated throughout the United States, received unauthorized copies.187  The 
Hotalings learned of the unauthorized copies and filed a copyright in-
fringement lawsuit against the Church.188 
The Hotalings asserted that the Church’s libraries infringed upon their 
copyright protections by distributing the unauthorized copies of their work 
to the public.189  Although the Hotalings were unable to prove that anyone 
viewed the unauthorized copies in the Church’s libraries, they argued that 
because the libraries held the unauthorized copies in their collection and 
made them publically available, there was sufficient evidence to establish 
distribution within the meaning of section 106(3).190  The Church argued 
that holding a work in a library collection open to the public was considered 
nothing more than an offer to distribute.191  In order to establish actual 
 
182. Id. at 434 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A], at 8-124.1 (2001)). 
183. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D. Minn. 2008). 
184. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (D. Ariz. 2008) (in-
cluding a lengthy analysis of National Car Rental System); Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1223 (de-
dicating a section of the opinion to an analysis of National Car Rental System). 
185. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Chirst of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
186. Id. at 201. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 201-02. 
189. Id. at 203. 
190. Id.  The libraries did not keep a record of the public’s use of the microfiche files.  Id. 
191. Id. 
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distribution, evidence must prove that a member of the public accepted such 
an offer.192 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded when a public library 
includes a work in its collection, lists the work in its indexing system, and 
makes the work accessible to the public, all the requirements of a distribu-
tion to the public have been met. 193  The court also noted that if the 
library’s actions did not establish a distribution, copyright holders would be 
prejudiced by a library that does not keep records of the public’s use.194  
Courts have interpreted Hotaling to conclude that making a file available 
for others to download over a peer-to-peer network constitutes distribu-
tion.195 
C. ATLANTIC RECORDING CORPORATION V. HOWELL 
In Atlantic Recording Corporation v. Howell, Atlantic Recording Corp. 
(Atlantic) filed a copyright infringement claim against Jeffery Howell on 
August 29, 2006.196  The RIAA’s investigator, MediaSentry, discovered 
that Howell had 2,329 sound recordings, including specific sound record-
ings to which Atlantic owned copyrights, in his computer’s shared folder 
available to peer-to-peer users.197  Evidence of Howell’s infringement con-
sisted only of screenshots of Howell’s shared folder, his peer-to-peer user-
name, and his IP address.198  With this evidence, Atlantic moved for sum-
mary judgment, claiming there was no disputed issue of material fact.199  
Atlantic alleged that Howell violated its exclusive distribution right by 
placing these files in his peer-to-peer shared folder and making them avail-
able for all other peer-to-peer users to download.200 
The United States District Court granted Atlantic’s summary judgment 
motion.201  In making this determination, the court cited Perfect 10 and 
 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, 
at *3-4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006) (“Listing unauthorized copies of sound recordings using an on-
line file-sharing system constitutes an offer to distribute those works, thereby violating a copy-
right owner’s exclusive right of distribution.”); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 
F.3d 701, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that under the Hotaling analysis, if an owner of a work 
makes the work openly available to the public, the owner will be deemed to have distributed cop-
ies of the work). 
196. Howell, 2007 WL 2409549, at *1. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at *6. 
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Hotaling and held that the distribution of copyrighted material did not re-
quire a physical transfer.202  Furthermore, if an individual makes copy-
righted works available to the public, that individual may be deemed to 
have distributed the works in violation of section 106(3).203  The court con-
cluded that peer-to-peer users commit direct infringement when using peer-
to-peer networks to make copyrighted works available to other users.204  
Additionally, whether an individual directly oversees the unauthorized dis-
tribution is relevant.205  The court concluded that no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact existed because Howell admitted at his deposition that sound 
recordings were distributed from his peer-to-peer shared folder.206 
Howell argued that he owned the compact discs of the song recordings 
in question, and simply converted the discs into digital music files on his 
computer for personal use.207  However, the fact that Howell owned 
authorized copies of the sound recordings was irrelevant.208  What was rele-
vant was whether he distributed the copies of the recordings without 
authorization.209  Howell’s right to use the copyrighted sound recordings 
purchased for personal enjoyment did not grant him the right to distribute 
those sound recordings to others without the copyright holder’s authoriza-
tion.210 
The court granted the RIAA’s summary judgment motion and awarded 
statutory damages in the amount of $40,500.211  Howell filed a Motion to 
Reconsider on August 30, 2007.212  The court granted the motion and called 
 
202. Id. at *3 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 718-19 (9th Cir. 
2007), Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1997), 
and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
203. Id. 
204. See id. (citing Interscope Records v. Duty, No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 
988086, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006)) (noting that possession of copyrighted sound recordings in 
a peer-to-peer shared folder may constitute copyright infringement); Warner Brothers Records, 
Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006) (finding 
that the placement of music files in a peer-to-peer shared folder was a publication under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 because the act is either a distribution or an offer of distribution where further distribution 
can occur); Arista Records LLC v. Gruebel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (ruling 
that screenshots, which show the contents of a defendant’s peer-to-peer shared folder, constituted 
a cognizable claim for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)). 
205. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 986 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
206. Id. at 979. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 983. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Order at 7, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 876 (D. Ariz. 2008) (No. 
CV-06-02076-PHX-NVW). 
212. See Motion to Reconsider at 3, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 
(D. Ariz. 2008) (No. 2:06-CV-02076-PHX-NVW) (disputing Howell’s deposition statements and 
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for further briefing in April 2008.213  On April 29, 2008, the court delivered 
a four-part analysis of the RIAA’s making available argument, and ulti-
mately concluded that the claim failed to establish unlawful distribution.214  
The Howell court’s analysis serves as a framework for how courts interpret 
several components of the RIAA’s making available argument.215  The 
analysis focuses on the following:  (1) how the courts should define “distri-
bution;” (2) determining if distribution is synonymous with publication; (3) 
evaluating whether evidence obtained by an investigator hired by the RIAA 
is admissible; and (4) considering whether digital transmissions constitute 
exchanges as required by the Copyright Act.216 
1. Defining Distribution 
The Howell court’s analysis notes that section 106(3) does not define 
the term “distribute,” and that the courts must interpret the statutory mean-
ing of the word.217  The court determined that an abundance of authority ex-
ists to support the general rule that infringement of the distribution right re-
quires an actual dissemination of a copy.218  The Howell court also noted 
that different jurisdictions have found that making a work available for 
download on a peer-to-peer network established distribution.219  Most 
courts, however, avoid addressing the making available argument by deny-
ing a defendant’s motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff failed to prove 
actual distribution.220  The Howell court noted, “unless a copy of work 
 
arguing that Howell never placed the copyrighted sound recordings in his peer-to-peer shared 
folder or authorized the sharing of those files). 
213. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
214. See id. at 986. 
215. See discussion infra Part III.C.1-4. 
216. See discussion infra Part III.C.1-4. 
217. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)). 
218. Id. (citing Nat’l Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l. Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th 
Cir. 1993)); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 718 (9th Cir. 2007); London-Sire 
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168-69 (D. Mass. 2008); Musical Prods., Inc. v. 
Roma’s Record Corp., No. 05-CV-5903(FB)(VVP), 2007 WL 750319, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2007); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Paramount 
Pictures Corp. v. Labus, No. 89-C-797-C, 1990 WL 120642, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 1990); 2 
NIMMER, supra note 182, 8-149 (2007); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9, 13-
13 (2007); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.5.1, 7:125 to 7:126 (3d ed. 
2005)). 
219. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (citing Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood, 
441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190-91 (D. Me. 2006) and Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, No. 04-CV-
2246, 2007 WL 576284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007)). 
220. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (citing Warner Bros. Records Inc. v. Payne, 2006 WL 
2844415, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006)) ( “[T]he Court is not prepared at this stage of the pro-
ceedings to rule out a possible ground for imposing liability.”); Interscope Records v. Duty, 2006 
WL 988086, at *3 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) (“To be clear, we do not conclude that the pres-
ence of copyrighted sound recordings in Duty’s share file constitutes copyright infringement.”); 
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changes hands in one of the designated ways, a ‘distribution’ under section 
106(3) has not taken place.”221  Furthermore, the court reiterated its posi-
tion, stating the sole act of making a file publically available to download 
does not violate a copyright holder’s exclusive right of distribution.222  The 
court acknowledged that evidence showing an individual made a work 
available for distribution to the public can support an inference that a copy 
was likely transferred to another individual.223  However, on its own, the 
evidence establishes only that an individual attempted to distribute a copy, 
thereby failing to prove that a copy actually changed hands.224 
2. Determining Whether Distribution Is Synonymous 
With Publication 
The second question in the Howell court’s analysis asked whether an 
offer to distribute constitutes distribution.225  The RIAA argued that even 
though the term “distribution” is not precisely defined in title 17 of the 
United States Code, it should be considered synonymous with the term 
“publication.”226  The RIAA’s argument thus provided that if an individual 
offered to distribute copyrighted works to other individuals for the purpose 
of further distribution, the individual distributed the works as a matter of 
law within the meaning of section 106(3).227  The court disagreed, and con-
cluded that there was no contextual support for equating distribution and 
publication.228 
 
Arista Records v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (denying the motion to 
dismiss because the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs at early 
stage of proceedings)). 
221. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 984. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id.  The statutory definition of “publication” is “[t]he offering to distribute copies or 
phonorecords to a group of persons for the purposes of further distribution. . . . ”  17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2006). 
227. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983. 
228. Id. at 984.  The court acknowledged that the terms were synonymous within the context 
of first publication.  Id.; see also Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 
(1985) (holding that publication of portions of a work that is soon to be published does not qualify 
as “fair use”).  The fair use doctrine allows for certain uses of copyrighted works, without 
permission or payment, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, or research.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  Fair use generally allows a user, contingent 
upon the licensing agreement, to make a digital backup copy of a copyrighted work such as 
software, music, or a movie.  See id. (noting that the character, purpose and economic impact of 
the use are factors taken into consideration in determining fair use).  However, it is illegal to share 
with or give to others backed up copies of copyrighted works.  Id. 
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The court found that under section 101, all distributions to the public 
constitute publications, but not all publications are distributions.229  The 
court reasoned that if the two words were truly synonymous, the statute’s 
definition of “distribution” would be unsatisfactory, because it could be 
read that distribution meant “‘distribution’ or an offering to distribute.”230  
A plain reading of section 106(3) indicates that a distribution requires a 
“sale or other transfer of ownership” or a “rental, lease, or lending” of a 
copy of the work.231  The statute, as interpreted by the Howell court, re-
quires an identifiable copy of a copyrighted work to change possession in a 
prescribed way for distribution to occur.232  Therefore, the court found that 
the RIAA failed to prove an actual distribution of any of the forty-two 
copyrighted sound recordings at issue.233 
3. The Admissibility of Evidence From the RIAA’s Investigator 
Next, the Howell court considered whether the RIAA may rely on the 
twelve downloads its investigator, MediaSentry, received from Howell to 
establish proof of actual distribution.234  The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
argued that a copyright owner cannot infringe upon its own copyright.235  
Therefore, downloads from an individual’s shared folder by MediaSentry, 
an agent of the copyright holder, cannot be considered infringement be-
cause MediaSentry acted on the owner’s behalf.236  The court addressed this 
issue and determined that the RIAA did not license MediaSentry to 
 
229. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 984 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. 
Supp. 2d 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008)). 
230. Id. at 985. 
231. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. §106(3) (2006)). 
232. Id. 
233. Id.  The court in London-Sire Records reached the same determination when it noted 
that the statute clearly suggests distribution is not synonymous with publication.  London-Sire, 
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008).  The London-Sire court provided a simple but detailed 
example to illustrate its holding that all distributions are publications, but not all publications are 
distributions: 
For example, suppose an author has a copy of her (as yet unpublished) novel.  If she 
sells that copy to a member of the public, it constitutes both distribution and publica-
tion.  If she merely offers to sell it to the same member of the public, that is neither a 
distribution nor a publication.  And if the author offers to sell the manuscript to a pub-
lishing house for purposes of further distribution, but does not actually do so, that is a 
publication but not a distribution.  Plainly, publication and distribution are not iden-
tical.  And Congress’ decision to use the latter term when defining a copyright 
holder’s rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) must be given consequence. 
Id. at 169. 
234. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 985-86. 
235. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 11-
13, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008) (No. 05-CV-7340) [he-
reinafter EFF Howell Brief]. 
236. Id. 
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authorize distribution or reproduce copies of the copyrighted works.237  In-
stead, the RIAA licensed MediaSentry to attempt to stop infringement.238  
Therefore, the court concluded MediaSentry should not be considered a 
copyright owner and any copies obtained by MediaSentry are a result of an 
unauthorized distribution.239  However, the court determined a disputed is-
sue of fact existed regarding Howell’s responsibility for making the files 
available, and thus the court could not conclusively determine that Howell 
was responsible.240 
4. Determining if Digital Transmissions Constitute Exchanges 
The fourth and final step of the Howell court’s analysis explored the 
nature of digital transmissions and file exchanges.241  The court concluded 
that the RIAA failed to prove that an individual who places a copyrighted 
work into a shared folder on a peer-to-peer network distributes the file 
when a third-party downloads the copyrighted work.242  Under the court’s 
analysis, the owner of the shared folder never makes or distributes an 
unauthorized copy of the work.243  The owner’s copy of the work resides in 
the owner’s shared folder on the owner’s hard drive, and at no time during 
the file transfer process does that copy leave its location.244  Instead, a third 
party makes a copy of a file located in the shared folder.245  The court deter-
mined this was insufficient to establish primary liability for copyright in-
fringement of the distribution right, but noted that this potentially creates 
secondary liability.246  The court faulted the RIAA for its failure to establish 
the distribution requirement.247  The RIAA failed to explain the framework 
of peer-to-peer networks in enough detail for the court to determine if the 
owner of the shared folder actually distributed a copy of the work or simply 
provided a third party with the ability to make a copy on the third party’s 
own accord.248  The court further concluded that even if contributory liabil-
 
237. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id.  (“Technically, ‘third parties are reaching into the individuals’ hard drive and taking 
an electronic file,’ so ‘the individual who has the work on his or her hard drive [can potentially be 
sued] for contributory infringement of the reproduction right’ but not primary infringement of the 
distribution right.” (quoting PATRY, supra note 218, at 13)). 
247. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
248. Id. 
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ity applies, the RIAA must prove that a third party actually downloaded an 
unauthorized copy of the copyrighted work.249  Congress did not intend the 
language of section 106, “to do and to authorize,” to establish a new form 
of liability for authorization detached from the legal consequences of autho-
rized conduct.250 
D. CAPITOL RECORDS, INC. V. THOMAS 
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, Jammie Thomas, a single mother 
from Minnesota, became the subject of the RIAA’s litigation against digital 
piracy facilitated through peer-to-peer networks.251  On April 19, 2006, 
Capitol Records filed a lawsuit against Thomas, alleging that she violated 
section 106(3) by illegally downloading and distributing sound recordings 
over a peer-to-peer network.252  Thomas downloaded 1,702 copyrighted 
music files in her computer’s shared folder, all of which were available to 
other peer-to-peer users for download.253  The RIAA alleged that Thomas 
downloaded a majority of the music files without obtaining permission 
from the copyright owners.254  Unusually, this case was not decided by 
summary judgment, default, or settlement.255  On October 2, 2007, the case 
became the first making available case tried by a jury.256 
At trial, Thomas challenged the RIAA’s proposed jury instruction re-
garding the definition of distribution under the Copyright Act.257  The 
instruction read, “[t]he act of making copyrighted sound recordings 
available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without 
license from the copyright owners, violated the copyright owners’ exclusive 
right of distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been 
shown.”258  After argument by the parties, the court used the RIAA’s pro-
posed instruction as written.259  The instruction required the jury to find in-
fringement if the jury determined that Thomas made the files available for 
distribution.260  The jury did not need to find actual distribution.261  The 
 
249. Id. at 987. 
250. Id. 
251. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212-13 (D. Minn. 2008). 
252. Id. 
253. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, for Remittitur, at 3, Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Thomas 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-2497). 
254. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212. 
255. Id. at 1213. 
256. See id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
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jury returned a verdict finding that Thomas willfully infringed the copyright 
on all twenty-four music files at issue.262  As a result, the jury awarded the 
recording company statutory damages in the amount of $9,250 for each act 
of infringement, totaling $222,000.263  The court entered the judgment on 
October 5, 2007.264 
However, on May 15, 2008, the court issued an Order requiring the 
parties to submit briefs regarding whether the court committed a manifest 
error of law and stating that the court was considering granting a new 
trial.265  The court’s concern of committing a manifest error of law was 
based upon the use of the RIAA’s proposed jury instructions, which al-
lowed for the RIAA’s making available argument.266  The court ultimately 
concluded that it committed an error of law and vacated the RIAA’s 
favorable verdict.267  This decision repudiated the RIAA’s only success at 
trial in its five-year copyright infringement litigation campaign.268 
The court addressed many of the same issues and arguments articulated 
in Howell, and its conclusions did not significantly differ from the determi-
nations in Howell.269  One argument Thomas expanded upon was the defini-
tion of distribution in the Copyright Act.270  Further analysis of Thomas 
also facilitates discussion of the implications of international treaties on the 
interpretation of the Copyright Act.271  This article’s analysis of Thomas 
concludes with a discussion on the large statutory damages awards allowed 
by the Copyright Act.272 
 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 1213, 1227. 
264. Id. at 1213. 
265. Id. 
266. Id.  Jury Instruction 15 contained the making available claim.  Id. 
267. Id. at 1228. 
268. David Kravets, Judge Declares Mistrial in RIAA-Jammie Thomas Trial, Wired.com, 
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/Not-for-publica/ (last visited October 
13, 2008). 
269. Compare Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (discussing the effect of an expanded defini-
tion of distribution, international treaties, and large statutory damages) with Atl. Recording Corp. 
v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008) (providing analysis on how to interpret the 
definition of distribution). 
270. See discussion infra Part III.D.1. 
271. See discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
272. See discussion infra Part III.D.3. 
        
2009] NOTE 397 
1. Expanded Definition of Distribution 
The court based part of its determination on how to properly define 
“distribute.”273  Generally, the United States Supreme Court requires a 
“strong presumption” that the plain language of a statute reflects Congress’ 
intent and should only be rebutted in “rare and exceptional 
circumstances.”274  Under the plain language of section 106(3), Congress 
clearly states that distribution may be effected by sale, transfer of owner-
ship, rental, lease or lending.275  The Thomas court observed that Congress’ 
language in section 106(3) does not suggest that merely making a work 
available for any of the listed activities constitutes a distribution.276 
The Thomas court next looked to the ordinary dictionary meaning of 
the word “distribute” to conclude that the word necessarily requires a trans-
fer of ownership or possession.277  Furthermore, the leading copyright 
treatises state that making a work available is insufficient to establish dis-
tribution.278  Alternatively, the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, 
opined to Congress in a 2002 letter that making a copyrighted work 
available violates the distribution right.279  However, the Thomas court 
noted that the rulings of the Register of Copyrights are not binding but are 
worth noting because of their persuasiveness.280 
The Thomas court also considered how other provisions of the United 
States Code describe or define distribution, and in doing so the court found 
that in at least one other provision Congress clearly defined distribution to 
include offers to distribute.281  But other provisions in the Copyright Act 
limit distribution to a physical transfer of copyrighted material.282  After 
analyzing the differing definitions of distribution found within the 
 
273. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. 
274. United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (2008). 
275. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
276. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. 
277. Id. at 1217.  The Thomas court cited Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 
1999) (“defining ‘distribute’ as, among other things, ‘1:  to divide among several or many:  
APPORTION’ and ‘b:  to give out or deliver esp. to members of a group’”). Id. 
278. See, e.g., 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
§ 8.11[A] (2008) (stating that infringement of the distribution right requires an actual dissemina-
tion of copies); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:11.50 (2009) (concluding that 
making a work available is insufficient to establish distribution). 
279. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 1217-18; see 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(4) (2006) (“to ‘distribute’ means to sell, or to 
lease, bail, or otherwise transfer, or to offer to sell, lease, bail or otherwise transfer”). 
282. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217; see 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (2006) (“For this purpose, 
and other than as provided in [Section 115(c)(3)], a phonorecord is considered ‘distributed’ if the 
person exercising the compulsory license has voluntarily and permanently parted with its 
possession.”). 
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Copyright Act, the Thomas court concluded that a uniform definition of the 
word does not exist.283  Congress demonstrated that when it intends for the 
definition of distribution to include “making available” or “offers to trans-
fer,” it will explicitly list a definition of the term within the statute.284  By 
all interpretations, the plain meaning of distribution requires actual 
dissemination, and simply making a work available does not fit within that 
meaning.285 
2. Impact of International Treaty Agreements 
In a separate part of its analysis, the Thomas court examined the impli-
cations of international law.286  The United States is a party to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and subscribes to the organiza-
tion’s World Copyright Treaty (WCT) and Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT).287  The WCT and WPPT recognize and provide for a mak-
ing available right that does not require evidence establishing that copies of 
a copyrighted work were actually transferred to particular individuals.288  
Considering both the executive and legislative branches of the government 
agreed to adopt and ratify these treaties, it appears that American law is in 
compliance with the treaties, and thus recognizes a making available 
right.289  Additionally, under Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,290 the 
United States Supreme Court established the Charming Betsy doctrine, 
which requires courts to adopt a reasonable interpretation of the law so as to 
ensure that the United States is in compliance with its treaty obligations.291 
The court noted in its application of the Charming Betsy doctrine that 
the WIPO treaties are neither self-executing nor legally binding, aside from 
their implementation in the Copyright Act.292  Since a non-self-executing 
 
283. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1217-18. 
284. Id. at 1218. 
285. Id. at 1218-19. 
286. Id. at 1225. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. (citing WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 6(1), art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; World Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 12(1) & (14), Dec. 
20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203). 
289. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225. 
290. 6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
291. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118. (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”). 
292. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1365 
(2008)).  A self-executing treaty is law that becomes effective immediately in domestic courts of 
the United States without requiring the implementation of an ancillary act of Congress or federal 
law. 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. 
COURTS § 10.7 (2006). 
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treaty requires legislation to make it law in the United States, the WIPO 
treaties do not establish an enforceable making available right in peer-to-
peer file sharing cases.293  Only if section 106(3) is found ambiguous will 
the treaty’s relevance be acknowledged.294  The doctrine creates a helpful 
tool for the purpose of statutory construction, but “clear congressional ac-
tion trumps customary international law and previously enacted treaties.”295  
The court concluded its international treaty analysis by stating that com-
pliance with the WIPO treaties would be improper because the United 
States cannot override the clear congressional intent in section 106(3).296 
3. Oppressive Statutory Damages Awards 
In its Memorandum and Order, the Thomas court petitioned Congress 
to review the outdated Copyright Act and amend it to address both the lia-
bility and statutory damages that derive from peer-to-peer network cases.297  
The court described the large statutory damage awards resulting from copy-
right cases as oppressive and grossly misapplied when applied to individual 
consumers.298  The numerous cases cited by the RIAA in support of uphold-
ing the large statutory damages awards involve corporate or business de-
fendants.299  In context, large damage awards deter future illegal commer-
cial conduct.300  Significantly, the recent barrage of peer-to-peer copyright 
infringement cases filed by the RIAA name individual consumers as 
defendants.301  Individual consumer infringement is motivated by the sim-
ple desire to have the music for personal use and enjoyment.302  Consumers 
do not attempt to seek profit from their acts of infringement.303 
Thomas neither received commercial gain from her alleged infringe-
ment, nor sought any form of profit.304  The court noted that large statutory 
damages are partly justified in copyright cases because the damages act as a 
deterrent to infringement by making the penalty for infringing substantially 
 
293. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (defin-
ing the effect of a self-executing treaty on the laws of the United States). 
294. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226. 
295. Id. (quoting Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 1227. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
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outweigh any potential gain.305  A particularly enticing lure that draws com-
mercial entities to engage in copyright infringement is the potential realiza-
tion of a tremendous increase in revenues.306  Alternatively, consumers who 
infringe on peer-to-peer networks by downloading copyrighted music bene-
fit by receiving access to free music, not the possibility of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in profits.307 
Courts do not condone copyright infringement actions of individual 
consumers, such as Thomas and Howell.308  Instead, the Thomas court sim-
ply labeled it absurd to compare the actions of consumers to those of global 
commercial businesses and corporations.309  Awarding $220,000 in dam-
ages against an individual who downloads twenty-four songs from a peer-
to-peer network, which is the approximate equivalent of three CDs costing 
less than $60, is “unprecedented and oppressive.”310 
Congress wrote the Copyright Act with the intent to allow statutory 
damages in amounts substantially more than the actual cost of the infringed 
work.311  These damages accomplish the goal of Congress to deter infringe-
ment and encourage the legitimate purchase of copyrighted work.312  How-
ever, statutory damages awards of hundreds of thousands of dollars are 
above and beyond the amount necessary to accomplish deterrence in indi-
vidual consumer cases.313  Damages reaching approximately one hundred 
times the cost of an infringed work act as an effective deterrent in actions 
involving individual consumers.314 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts should not respond to technological advancements by expand-
ing the copyright protections established in the Copyright Act beyond Con-
gress’ intent.315 
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional abil-
ity to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing 
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology. 
 
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 1227-28. 
311. Id. at 1227. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
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In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our 
course, we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights 
created by a legislative enactment which never contemplated such 
a calculus of interests.316 
Courts recognized long before the 1976 Act that copyright protections, as 
well as remedies for infringement, were entirely statutory.317  The United 
States Supreme Court stressed through cases such as Teleprompter and 
Bonito that a need for congressional guidance exists before courts rule and 
create rights that are not explicit in the Copyright Act.318  In light of the his-
tory of the Copyright Act and subsequent case law, the proper way to han-
dle questionable issues is to let Congress address them through the legisla-
tive process.319 
Congress must revisit the Copyright Act of 1976 and modify the act to 
suit today’s technological questions.320  The United States’ judicial system 
would benefit if Congress would address the act’s ambiguous language.321  
Congress would be prudent to define what exactly constitutes a distribution 
in the age of the Internet, to determine if digital transmissions are truly dis-
tributions, and to address the constitutionality of the large statutory dam-
ages awarded against individual consumers.322  Additionally, the question 
of whether making a copyrighted work available for distribution is intended 
to be an independent right or if circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 
prove distribution requires an answer.323  This answer should come from 
the legislative branch, not the judicial.324 
A clear definition of distribution is vital, especially in relation to the 
prospectively large statutory damages awards likely to be encountered by 
individual consumers accused of copyright infringement.325  Individual con-
 
316. Sony Corp. of Am. v. United City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). 
317. Id. 
318. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Institute of William Mitchell Col-
lege of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial at 21, Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) [hereinafter William Mitchell Thomas Brief]; 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974); Bonito Boats, Inc., 
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1991). 
319. See William Mitchell Thomas Brief, supra note 318. 
320. See id. at 20-22 (stating that the proper recourse for the RIAA is to engage Congress 
through the legislative process). 
321. See id. (indicating that cases consistently explain that courts should refrain from creat-
ing rights that are not explicit in the Copyright Act). 
322. Id. 
323. See id. (stating that any future making available right should be left for Congress to 
create and not the courts). 
324. Id. 
325. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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sumers do not engage in infringement with the intention of gaining great 
monetary profits, but do so because they desire to expand their personal 
collections of music.326  Regardless of intentions, the actions of copyright 
infringing consumers are not justified, but as the court stated in Thomas, 
statutory damages awards of hundreds of thousands of dollars is above and 
beyond the amount necessary to accomplish deterrence in individual con-
sumer cases.327  “[S]urely [the] damages that are more than one hundred 
times the cost of the works would serve as a sufficient deterrent” in in-
fringement actions involving individual consumers.328  Congress must 
amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to better regulate an increasingly 
technological world.329 
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